Shiffrin and Brettschneider

Brettschneider begins by recounting Adams’ tenure as president, where he raged at the press, plotted with his attorney general to silence critics and passed the Sedition Act. Interestingly, the initial conception of freedom of speech is not how we conceive of it today. Indeed, Brettschneider writes how “democratic constitutional constituencies,” or ordinary citizens who used the Constitution as a metaphorical weapon against authoritarian presidents, were the likes of newspaper editors (4). Thomas Cooper, for example, argued at his own sedition trial that citizens could not “exercise on rational grounds their elective franchise, if perfect freedom of discussion of public characters be not allowed” (40). Editors like Cooper used court trials as a resistance mechanism to spread discourse about democracy and free speech, eventually leading to Jefferson’s election in 1800. Most interestingly, Brettschneider notes that this “did not come from self-correcting mechanisms inherent in the Constitution's structure,” but from citizens who built a constituency around a democratic understanding of the First Amendment (3). 

Instead of pointing out a lacuna or grievance with the reading as I usually do, I’m interested in discussing what this means for citizens today, who can actually evaluate democratic arguments. Despite the rudimentary press system in 1798, newspaper editors then could still hold influence through their work being reprinted everywhere in a decentralized manner. For example, trial transcripts were reprinted despite editors like Cooper being jailed. But today, I’m unsure if that pluralist structure is still present. In some ways, free speech seems to be more restrictive in certain facets. Most people get their information from a few online platforms like Twitter, and President Trump has used Truth Social to speak his mind. But these private platforms present real constraints; for example, Truth social requires giving personal information to even see posts, an argument from Shiffrin’s discussion I found particularly compelling. Clearly, Trump is no James Madison. But what does this mean for free speech now? In 1798, editors succeeded because their arguments could be circulated and debated that no single authority controlled. If we follow Shiffrin’s argument that social media platforms should restrict lies, can arguments actually reach people, especially if algorithms (that these companies control) work to promote certain types of content? Balancing the distinction between factual arguments and opinions is a fine line, and if we followed Shiffrin’s solution, I worry if that deviates from the circulatory structure of Adams era editors, which allowed for the democratization of the First Amendment. 

 

Comments

  1. Nethra MahendranMay 5, 2026 at 8:27 AM

    Andy, I think that you raise a genuinely interesting thought. However, I believe that your concern about today’s fragmentation of information actually has a partial answer within Brettschneider’s own account – which complicates your worry even more.

    You focus on Cooper’s trial as the key mechanism of democratic recovery, however Brettschneider emphasizes that the success of the editors depended on something more than just circulating arguments. It required convincing a successor president to institutionalize their vision. As he writes, democratic constitutional constituencies succeeded “because they convinced subsequent presidents to adopt their vision of democratic restoration — not merely to undo the previous president's damage, but to build a new foundation of political values” (4). Therefore the circulatory structure of the press that you describe is crucial, but it is a means to an end rather than the end itself.

    I believe this offers even more of a claim to Andy’s concern about Shiffrin’s platform-restriction argument. If the goal itself is electing recovery presidents, then restricting the circulation of arguments (even ones that are false) on the platforms that people actually use seems very dangerous. Brettschenider does note that Madison’s refusal to support a new sedition act was crucial because “without presidential support, the movement to shut down the opposition fizzled” (75). Therefore, platform algorithms that function as de facto ‘gatekeepers’ mimic a similar concentrated editorial control that the Adams-era editors were fighting against–though that was privatized rather than governmental.

    Ultimately, Brettschneider’s framework seems to suggest that Shiffrin’s solution not only risks undermining the structure of democratic argument, but it also risks eliminating the entire political pathway to recovery that Brettschneider deems essential to constitutional restoration.

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