Popular Sovereignty in Wartime: An American Contradiction

 I want to examine the idea of wartime and its effect on presidential behavior, and opportunity for power grab. It seems that Madison was resistant to extending executive power during the War of 1812 because the war was so divisive between parties. And Adams used the tension from the French revolution to justify attacks on the opposing party. In the face of foreign policy issues, wartime has been the basis for presidential power grabs. I am wondering how the role of commander in chief of the military and chief diplomat with the constitutional role can be hijacked to justify unitary theories of presidential power. 

James Madison is the ideal of the American President™ in the face of constitutional constituency, mob riots, and war, he was able to preserve the ideal of the freedom to dissent, “the result was a president who embraced the idea of popular sovereignty; even during war” (81). This trend died with Madison. Wartime has been the scene of the most blatant power grabs over the course of American history. Andrew Jackson, the next president, warred with Native Americans and became a national hero, from Reagan, to “George W. Bush [who] expanded wartime authority on the theory that constitutional protections applied with less force abroad” (210), and many more examples. 

Brettschneider makes it clear that there is a correct interpretation of the president’s role: it is one that ensures the freedom to dissent over their own ego or reputation, one that promotes the rule of law over the rule of men. Madison’s account directly contradicts the unitary executive theories which state that the executive branch should be expanded. There is a contradictory role between the top military general and constitutional executive- and I do not believe that they will be solved, they create the soil for extortion and unconstitutional acts time and time again. 

Now, considering the role of the American press today and in the past, it seems that the role of war and international tensions justifies attacks on internal “enemies” and “traitors”. How can the rhetoric of war, even the “war on drugs” and “illegal immigration” be used as a means for extending the unitary executive theory? Does the Constitution truly scaffold against the President manipulating the people from their role as commander-in-chief? Are we back in the Federalist times where dissent is silenced in the name of “national security”? At the same time, are we continuing to see people’s liberties taken in the name of libel and treason?


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