70% of Americans Bring Peril to Brettschneider

 Brettschneider posits an alarming account of how vast executive power has been used to undermine fundamental democratic pillars like the right to dissent and the rule of law. Providing examples of past recorrections, and to prevent further ones, he promulgates a solution through “democratic constitutional constituencies” composed of ordinary citizens who read and interpret the Constitution for themselves. Notably, Brettschneider's account of executive accountability is not limited to scholars and ideologues; the burden equally rests on the shoulders of ordinary American citizens. He writes, "the Constitution isn’t the exclusive province of lawyers or judges...all Americans can be considered witnesses tasked with holding the president accountable to the Constitution." (15). 


Thus rises a fervent polity of constitutional laymen, forming what Brettschneider dubs as “democratic constitutional constituencies”. These constituencies are groups of “citizen readers of the Constitution” who use the document to oppose authoritarian presidents and “bolster their efforts at democratic restoration”. (4)They are empowered largely by “their ability to galvanize the support of other citizens”, and have historically “relied primarily on politics, not litigation, to achieve their goals” (4). 


This, for Brettschneider, is the true embodiment of “We The People”. Yet I believe that in modern-day America, such a solution is idealistic, and frankly, unrealistic. 


In the 21st century, Americans are wholly uneducated about how the government functions, not least about their constitutional obligations to preserve it. The Chamber of Commerce reports that more than 70% of Americans fail a basic civic literacy quiz on topics like the three branches of government, the number of Supreme Court justices, and other basic functions of our democracy. Equally tragically, only half of Americans correctly labeled the legislative branch as a lawmaking apparatus. For Brettschneider's “democratic constitutional constituencies”, this is rather disheartening. If the people are to assume the grand task of constitutional protection, mustn't they first know what they are protecting? Without an apt, even a basic, understanding of how the Constitution functions, how are they expected to uphold its dictum?

Perhaps the solution to such perils begins with civic education. Almost 86% of students take a dedicated civics or U.S. government course, but clearly, this is not effective in educating our citizens. Democratic constitutional constituencies cannot be created without impetus, and certainly not if citizens are incapable of recognizing when executive power has crossed a line. If Brettschneider wants citizens to “distinguish legitimate constitutional behavior from illegitimate”, we must first teach them what legitimate even means.

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