Zuckerburg & the Social Culture of Freedom of Speech

While government speech may not be nonjusticiable, trusting the private actors like Facebook and friends with "keeping under-enforced Constitutional norms relevant" may be a step in the wrong direction (1014). When discussing private enforcement, more attention should be placed on individual citizens.

The business model of profitable information disseminators like Facebook or Fox is almost certainly out of line with the social culture of free speech. Media companies earn more from longer user retention. To remain competitive, they must produce highly saturated, dopaminergic, and polarized content. By the 2010s, the use of "echo chamber" exploded to describe this model. Media companies are incentivized to impassion and radicalize their users. In no way is this in line with the tolerant marketplace of ideas and open dialogue championed by the social culture of free speech. Addictive algorithms are not a form of intellectual humility.

Trusting businesses brings another issue. Because government speech is nonjusticiable, private companies must "make their own assessments about what the First Amendment requires" (1014). This opens the floodgates to a number of issues. Let's forget about the failure of nonhuman content moderation algorithms. That is its own can of worms. By allowing companies to make their own interpretations, CEOs become the arbiters of deplatforming and human moderators their police force. A speech monopoly of Zuckerburg, Musk, and friends will be created. Violating their idea of the First Amendment will be social and political suicide.

Additionally, letting risk-averse companies call the shots will create a de facto veto. If a specific type of speech threatens advertiser relationships or causes a public relations issue, even if it is Constitutional, it will be removed. The criterion for free speech will effectively become whether the speech aligns with maximizing shareholder value. Private media actors already have incredible influence in shaping culture. Giving them First Amendment interpretation privileges will strengthen this psychological grip. Giving CEOs disproportionate control of the Constitution is unamerican.

The right private actor to trust is individual citizens. Misinformation and disinformation can become culturally taboo with enough restructuring of education and encouragement on active research over passive consumption. Informal regulation form individual citizens have already proven successful in cultural matters like the downturn in racist rhetoric. In Skokie v American Nazi party, the Court allowed fascist Americans to stage a protest on public streets. In response, the residents of Skokie the Illinois Holocaust Museum. With enough work, Americans can develop a healthy skepticism of government speech and keep figures like President Trump more accountable.

Comments

  1. GeorgiaApril 30, 2026 at 9:07 AM

    Dylan I think you are right to highlight the culture of free speech in America as something explicitly related to the way our media companies comport themselves- as in their business models have only become more profitable with the divisive nature of our politics, and they can be argued that they are partially culpable. The answer to this problem must come from society itself, given the limits in justiciability and the social media company interests. A democratic response involving education campaigns, and awareness of what should become "socially taboo" seems to be the strongest response in order to uphold the value of the constitution and the social importance of correct speech.

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