Truth, Friendship, Institutions

The choice to lie for a friend can be viewed as a choice between allegiance to virtue (honesty/truthfulness) and allegiance

to a relationship. But for Macintyre, this is a misunderstanding of both friendship and the self. Maclyntyre argues that

every practice requires a relationship between those who participate in it, defending the Aristotelian view of friendship

where friends “share in the pursuit of certain goods” (191). Friendship as a practice is governed by virtues. So, lying to

a friend, even if the lie was intended to spare pain, directly undermines the prerequisites that make the friendship possible. 


A choice to disobey a virtue (like truthfulness/honesty) to satisfy the demands of a friend is a direct violation of integrity

and constancy. Integrity requires a singleness of purpose in a whole life, which is impossible if one shifts between

different versions of oneself, being virtuous in private but calculating when social circles demand it. Maclyntyre would

then argue that without integrity there is no self left to be a friend, and that to disobey your virtues is asking you to

destroy the narrative unity that makes your life (and friendships) intelligible. He defends that virtues must be practiced

“without regard to consequences” (198). 

Yet, the account becomes challenging when differing cultural codes are introduced. A Lutheran Piest teaches children absolute honesty, whereas Traditional Bantu instructs children to remain guarded around strangers. Macintyre argues that despite variations in application, each of these codes still embody an acknowledgement of the virtue of truthfulness.

However, If truthfulness is socially defined by local practices, does it lead to moral relativism? The even greater danger is that if global virtues are defined by local social practices, how can they guard against the corrupting influence of institutions? And because the individual is a critical barrier to corruption, does dependence on few individuals - who are also under pressure to maintain the institution/community practice – exacerbate this risk? If the mere survival of a local church or school (maintaining property, paying staff) depends on collapsing into an institution, then those institutions end up shaping the very virtues they were intended to protect.


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