Subjective Merit v. Deterministic Proportionality

Harris rejects the notion that merit is an objective fact based on neutral criteria, instead asserting it is a constructed idea (Harris, 1771). She argues that traditional merit criteria such as GPAs and standardized test scores are socially constructed (and reconstructed) to maintain white privilege and protect the settled expectations of white people. Notably, these metrics were not prominently used until the late 1940s/early 1950s, correlating with the NAACP’s pre-Brown equalization strategy forcing institutions to admit Black students, highlighting their function to maintain hierarchy (Harris, 1771, fn 277). 

In place of these metrics, Harris advocates for measuring merit through distributive justice. Drawing on Ronald Fiscus’s work, she operates from the premise that abilities are distributed relatively equally among all races at birth. If racial groups have equal potential, a fair world absent of racial oppression would distribute societal benefits (such as spots in a medical school) in proportion. Black individuals not securing an accurate proportion of societies resources can be explained through “ only racial subordination” (Harris, 1783, fn 314). 


This sets up a binary equating any non-proportional outcome as discriminatory. Further, the framework of proportionality will inevitably cause merit to be continuously reconstructed to meet proportional outcomes, exactly the social engineering Harris is against. 


Perhaps to defend against inevitable social construction, Harris introduces a sort of just construction with the concept of “false merit.” She argues that white males (or other groups) who are disadvantaged by this measurement are not being discriminated against, but are rather being stripped from their “false merit” (Harris, 1784). By labeling current merit as false, Harris is fundamentally changing the definition of merit away from achievement and demonstrated skill (even if said achievement is partially the result of societal privilege) towards the realization of a predetermined group outcome. Just as she argues traditional metrics collapse the “multifaceted set of human capabilities,” her proportionality metric seems to collapse the individual (Harris, 1772). I concur with her assessment of the current merit metrics as reductionary, but is her alternative of proportionality any less reductive?


Comments

  1. Arjun_VohraApril 22, 2026 at 11:26 PM

    Sophie, I think this is a natural objection to raise against Harris' account, and one she seeks to categorically address. To your point of the distributive framework of proportionality being "exactly the social engineering Harris is against", she would disagree with the analogous nature of the two types of outcome-centered social engineering. Harris' framework, rather than being solely a form of social engineering for a predetermined end, is an attempt to unravel and disavow the hidden social engineering already at work. She argues that the current framework is particularly insidious in its deceptive capability, as it "masks what is chosen as natural" and "obscures the consequences of social selection as inevitable," making a biased status quo (the one you point out results in "false merits") appear to be a neutral & natural baseline (1778). For Harris, her methods of conscious intervention are preferable to this pre-existing masked intervention, even though they require patterned engineering. In fact, Harris even goes as far as to make the claim that the continuous reassessment of her framework (which you find fault with) may even be an advantage, as it leads to conspicuous outcomes, as opposed to the nebulously distorted ones engendered by the current framework. She writes that "because affirmative action can only be implemented through conscious intervention and requires constant monitoring and reevaluation, it does not function behind a mask of neutrality in the realm beyond scrutiny". (1786).

    In response to your claim that "her proportionality metric seems to collapse the individual", by which I assume you mean she deprives individuals of personal achievement, Harris is operating under the framework of "relative equality of abilities among the races at birth". (1783, fn 314). Her definition of "false merit" arises here, because under equal natural ability, any significant departure from proportional outcomes cannot be attributed to a lack of individual talent or "natural" differences, but rather the opportunities that lead to this ability going (un)realized. Hence, what you perceive as a "reductive" proportionality metric is, to Harris, the only way to account for the structural forces that currently prevent the realization of true individual potential, which is equal by nature.

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