Why only reform is not enough

In his work The idea of Prison Abolition, Tommie Shelby follows Angela Davis and other abolitionist’s clear arguments that are grounded in real perceptions of our current liberal democracy. Shelby seems to agree with much of the basis of the argument for abolition yet he ultimately settles for a nuanced and unfulfilling answer. 

Shelby discusses many ways that imprisonment has been oppressive. He distinguishes between the latent and manifest functions which represent the unofficial purpose of an institution compared to its official purpose, respectively (104). He considers why the latent functions of prisons are intrinsically built to be oppressive in societies like ours. He refers to Davis here who would argue that “racial disparity in imprisonment and the racialization of prisoners are not “incidental” features of capitalist society but a necessary consequence of a capitalist system with roots in race based slavery and colonialism” (104). However, Shelby believes that the very fact that prisons are functional for unjust societies doesn’t show that prisons exist because they are functional for unjust societies (106). Therefore, Shelby argues we just need serious reform to the prisons. He argues that if social conditions from this reform lead us to circumstances where prisons are no longer necessary, abolition would follow (108). 


The issue with Shelby’s claim is that it fails to account for how reform comes about and the extreme strength and stability of capitalistic imperialism structures. Shelby states, “It is not that prisons are inherently dangerous or prone to abuse no matter the social environment. The social context matters enormously,” (113). I’d argue Shelby fails to fully and truly consider the origin of prisons for incarcerated people. In the United States, immediately after the abolishment of slavery, the carceral system exploded. This is because it serves as a continuation mechanism of slavery, an institutionalized way to exploit black Americans for labor. To ignore this idea is to misunderstand the purpose of prisons. To change the constantly reinforced idea in one’s head that prisons are actually not places for “bad” people seems radical because it is meant to seem radical. But, if prisons are places for bad people, then that would mean that the majority of people in prisons, black and brown Americans, are predisposed to be “bad” people - which is biologically untrue. It is merely a direct consequence of extreme oppressive institutions that function unchecked. 


The problem with reform is it does not do enough. It does not counter the fact that the very existence of prisons is the constant perpetuation of deeply horrific racial structures. A moratorium on imprisonment acts as a pausing mechanism that doesn’t dismantle any system that perpetuates such oppressive imprisonment. Reform is not enough unless it is with the intention of truly dismantling the system, which is abolition. This is because reform simply puts a bandaid on the problem, convincing societies of progress just because it is relative. It is that progress that creates complacency. Imperial violence and capitalistic oppression will always be present until the structures that preserve it are fully torn down. 

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