Hijacking Efficiency

Elizabeth Anderson, in her book Hijacked, makes an intriguing case of social democracy as the successor of classic liberalism. She grounds the progressive work ethic in reciprocity and democratic citizenship, using examples from Paine, Condorcet, and Bernstein. But what really interests me is Anderson’s definition of efficiency. 

Interestingly enough, Anderson does insist that she doesn’t “disparage considerations of efficiency, economic growth, and the usefulness of markets”, and makes it clear that she intends to “expand the range of normative concerns in economics” (286). But on the other hand, in her denouncement of neoliberalism, she uses this same idea of efficiency (that she claims to not be hostile towards) to reduce such workers to “interchangeable and disposable parts, without bargaining power” (255). This reduction is meant to signify the lower cost. Similarly, she details how private prisons claim to operate under the name of efficiency, cutting “salaries, staff numbers, and staff training” even though they continue to operate unjustly (increasing assault rates) (267). Although she claims to hold no hostility towards efficiency, her description of the neoliberalism account seems to be one that hides behind the concept of efficiency–which appears contradictory to me. 

In Anderson’s own argument, she implicitly relies on efficient reasoning as well. When discussing codetermination at Volvo, she notes that “workers were enthusiastic about getting more interesting work and prospects for upward mobility, and productivity rose” (249). When discussing Paine, she addresses social insurance as partially justified because it ensures that workers have “the tools and education they need to command above-poverty wages” (230). But aren’t the concepts of upward mobility, productivity, and tool-use all related to efficiency? From what I can see, Anderson makes efficiency arguments – she just doesn’t explicitly denote them as “efficient”. 

Anderson’s deployment of the term “efficient” appears quite selective. If “efficiency” (even though she doesn’t explicitly classify her argument as efficient) is legitimate when it supports social democratic conclusions but an ideological mask when it supports the neoliberalism account, then how can it be a valid critique? Or if it is, what constitutes Anderson’s definition of efficiency – and how is it better than a neoliberalist’s definition of efficiency? 

 

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