Condemnation and Latent Influence in the Institution of Punishment

 In both Shelby's chapter on punishment and prison abolition, I was struck by how methodically he successfully outlines the purpose, morally and politically, of punishment. Punishment must exist to a certain level. It is true that the injustice perpetuated by the basic structure of society remains the core issue of all problems. In the context of an unjust structure, the force of any potential for complete prison abolition would not be as radical as is necessary to establish the criminal justice system as morally justified and fair. 


For that reason, I want to explore the distinction that Shelby makes between the punitive and condemnatory role of the criminal justice system, and at the same time, compare that to the critique Shelby makes of functional arguments about institutional ideologies. Firstly, Shelby explains that criminal justice is often viewed as a combination of penalties and condemnation, because not only do these crimes seem to deserve direct punishment, but also “[public condemnation of] acts that have been duly demonstrated to violate the political community’s laws against harmful wrongdoing” (Shelby 238). But many views about condemnation equivocate it with penal punishment, hard labor, incarceration and death penalty as with condemnation. Shelby argues against this by separating the state’s purpose of punishment with condemnation, “such condemnation needn’t be justified in terms of how it contributes to moral reform of offenders or to reconciliation of offenders with their fellow citizens” (Shelby 242). In unjust circumstances, the state has lost most of its legitimate authority which means that its role as moral guide or force of condemnation is already weakened and distorted. Holding someone accountable for a wrong means that there is an “impartial judge” who can determine the punishment. This redefinition of both the purpose of punishment by the state and for those accused is very powerful when considering the question of prison abolition. If we deny the state the right to moral condemnation in criminal justice, then can we reckon with the ideological basis, or latent influence that haunts the institution itself?


In his Theory of Prison Abolition, Shelby analyzes Angela Davis’ philosophical arguments about the necessity of prison abolition. In Chapter 3, he discusses the functional critique of the criminal justice system, which claims that its grips of ideology create its perpetual injustice and racist uses against Black communities. I think there is a clear connection here that in the United State’s government role of “condemning” crimes (which it does even as an unjust structure) is the racist latent influence on the institution itself. Shelby argues that even if the prison system were to be abolished, most of the problems for Black people come from social stereotypes that are reinforced by criminal justice institutions, “the racist stereotype is that black people are disposed to commit crimes, which does not depend on their being caught, charged, or caged” (Shelby, “Racism and Functional Critique, 101).


This raises his most important idea: even though the basic structure is so unjust, the role of punishment, legitimate authority, and some forms of incarceration are arguably necessary for justice. In this sense, reforming criminal justice frameworks first, could transform the system, and with it, transform intrinsic institutional racism in powerful ways: by removing the “symbolic” (and racist) conception of condemnation as the job of the criminal justice system. 

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