We will all die, but at least we have democracy

**Want to preface by saying that first two paragraphs are irrelevant to my argument, merely there to contextualize the readings**

In Democratic Rights, Brettschiender rejects the viewing of democracy through two unilateral perspectives. He condemns the independent usage of both the Epistemic, procedure-oriented view, and the non-procedural, outcome-centric view. The Epistemic view, which is procedure-oriented, maintains that democratic legitimacy is solely derived from following fair decision-making processes. Proponents of such theories “defend majoritarian procedures as valid means of lawmaking because they tend toward the promotion of truth”. Brettschiender dismisses purely epistemic views by stating procedures can be fair and properly followed, yet still produce laws or policies that undermine citizens’ status as free and equal co-rulers. He writes that “procedural theories…neglect to provide guarantees that the outcomes of the democratic process will also respect citizens’ fundamental interests”, claiming that procedural methodologies bear the burden of being counterintuitive. For example, a majority could pass a law that disenfranchises a minority, even through perfectly fair voting. 

Similarly, he rejects the sole embracing of the opposite viewpoint, the non-procedural prescriptive as well. Proponents of such an outcome-centric interpretation of democracy evaluate democracy solely by the content of policy outcomes, regardless of how those outcomes were decided. Brettschiender takes issue with such theories by stating that in such cases, if one prioritizes outcomes to a high enough degree, and allows non-majoritarian institutions to take charge, they “neglect the intrinsic worth of individual participation in favor of what I regard as an excessive focus on Democratic outcomes.”

In deriding the failures of the two common views of democracy and to evade the Problem of Contrasint, Brettschiender proposes his own perspective -- The Value Theory of Democracy. The Value Theory of Democracy holds that legitimacy cannot be derived from procedure alone, nor from outcomes evaluated independently of democratic participation. Instead, democratic legitimacy depends on both procedures and outcomes being guided by core democratic values: equality of interests, political autonomy, and reciprocity. These values define what it means for citizens to rule as free and equal “rulers of the law”.  In upholding these values, both perspectives of democracy must be employed. Procedures are important because they help secure them, but they are not sufficient on their own; outcomes must respect these values to be considered democratically legitimate. Equality of interests ensures “rule for the people”; political autonomy “entails the treatment of citizens as individual rulers"; and reciprocity is the usage of  “autonomy and equality to discern the limits of coercion”. (23,24,25)

I take issue with Brettschiender on the shortcomings of his principles, namely, political autonomy. In maintaining political autonomy,  Brettschiender suggests that nothing can be done to interfere with a democratic process that brings about the detriment of society (with the expectation of those decisions that harm democracy en masse). He writes that, in the event of citizens voting for their own demise, “in a manner that undermined the overall good”, the principles of democracy forbid any intervention, as “even if such forced voting might result in more overall good, it would be undemocratic to force citizens to vote in a particular way”. (24) Brettschiender softens these blows in Chapter 7, when he permits Justice Tension to “decide whether to overturn a bad democratic outcome” if it violates his principles of democracy. But what about those decisions that are bad for society yet do not invalidate democracy? Brettschneider’s framework offers little guidance here. Because legitimacy is tied to the values of equality, political autonomy, and reciprocity, a decision can remain fully democratic even if its consequences are socially detrimental, as long as citizens participated freely and equally and the law respects reciprocity. In such cases, democracy is preserved, but the “overall good” may suffer. For example, imagine a society where citizens democratically vote to legalize a highly polluting industry in order to gain short-term economic benefits. Such a vote does not infringe upon any of the core democratic liberties of individuals, so Justice Tension cannot get involved, and everyone bears the banes of such a policy equally, so reciprocity cannot be used to object. Should we all be doomed to die then, because we cannot contest a democratically legitimate vote?