Unsurprisingly Brettschnieder falls into the liberal trap

 Brettschneider introduces the problem with democracy as the alleged tension between substantive rights and democratic proceduralism (7). He writes that the value of democratic proceduralism lies in democratic efforts to ensure that the people who are affected by democratic legislation have a part in that decision making - majoritarianism. Here, he acknowledges the obvious constraint between how to reconcile external constraints on democratic procedures while supporting the protection of substantive rights that serve to limit majority tyranny (8). Interestingly, Brettshneider seems to accept immediately that this form of government must include an extent of coercion. In fact, he writes that democracy should be ultimately enforced as the best way to legitimize the state's use of force (19). To recognize coercion as a necessity of the state and to further deem the state’s use of force as a necessity seems misguided if Brettschneider is genuine about fulfilling his “core principles of democracy”: political autonomy, equality of interests and reciprocity. 


I’m immediately dissuaded by his argument when assessing how genuine the implications of these ideas could be when Brettschneider seems to be misguided on the premise of ideas like colonialism, which at their purest form embody taking the political autonomy of others with self-interest as prime motivation. For example, he writes that “Even when colonists are granted procedural rights, colonialism is undemocratic when the governing power fails to serve the legitimate interest of the governed” (22). This statement seems intrinsically true by virtue yet it should also imply no form of colonization could possibly serve as a model of democracy or embody any sort of ideals comparable to that. Brettschneider doesn’t go further into this point, rather he seems to almost indicate that should the interests of the colonies be prioritized, there would be a very democratic aspect to colonialism. Therefore, his misunderstanding of what colonists intentions could be seems to indicate to me his misunderstanding of citizens in a political society. Ideas of political autonomy are infringed upon by the very coercive powers he believes states should have. What autonomy are we providing citizens with except confining them to seek out their individual interests and goals without a genuine understanding of the freedom, or lack thereof, that they possess. 


The sentiments expressed by Brettschneider feel similar to classic neoliberal ideas that on a surface level aspire to create some sort of benefits, like equal rights to opportunity or equal weight of one’s preferences, as he writes, yet in turn his proposals exhibit a surface level understanding of citizenry or democratic obligation (23). He seems well-intentioned in his reasons for the value theory as well as his goals of what he wants democracy to represent, yet his naivety in understanding the liberal state and its objectives is salt in the wound, another contribution to surface level democratic changes that funnel hope into liberal minds to convince them small legislative changes will fix our democratic system. Real change is not genuinely suggested by Brettschneider, rather he seeks to reconcile the constraints of democracy with the freedoms it promises. 

Comments

  1. GeorgiaFebruary 19, 2026 at 9:26 AM

    You point out something worth discussing in Brettschneider: how value theory of democracy could allow for and even support coercion of people by the state/policies, especially exhibited in his arguably weak example about American Colonists, where he misses the most fundamenal issue with colonialism. However, I want to respond to what you call "his misunderstanding of citizens in a political society". Brettschneider is relatively clear about his perspective of the political citizen, that each person in a democracy is a sovereign ruler. It seems like his issues with fighting coercion comes from his objections to majoritarianism and pure procedural theories of democracy- which allows any majority to make any rules through a procedure, which can then be claimed as democractic by the mere method it is enacted. However, here is where Brettschneider is referring to coercion, where a mob-like mentality of the majority can take over to disenfranchise people, or allow for inherently un-democratic ideals to be undermined. I see his arguments around coercion more concerned with the untamed will "of the people" that could endanger people's substantive rights. This argument could be perceived to uphold the liberal democratic perspective that seems to think people cannot make their own decisions as sovereign rulers, but I think that Brettschneider is more concerned with real issues of democracy, like the Texas rulings he cites in the introduction. In these examples, it is the state, per say, that is coercing, but it is really the majoritarian self-rulers in a democracy that are using procedure to obstruct substantial rights.

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  2. Paul HurleyFebruary 19, 2026 at 9:58 AM

    Two fascinating topis here: State Coercion, and Colonialism.
    Coercion: I'm excited for the two of you to develop this point, but I'm a little unclear about what the opposition to state coercion by Nandini involves. I want to drive on the left side of the road. I want, as a Catholic, to kill abortion doctors to protect the unborn. I want to exclude people with certain ethnic or religious profiles from my neighborhood. Shouldn't the state prevent me from doing such things? And isn't such state coercion legitimate? I'm unclear how any state that enforces laws can avoid coercing those who ignore them. Is it kinds of coercion that are not OK? If so, what kinds?

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