The Risk of Human Emancipation: Absorbing the Abstract Citizen

Political emancipation is often seen as the highest form of liberty. On the contrary, Marx argues that it is actually a reduction (Marx, 46). By abolishing the political character of civil society, the state does not eliminate inequalities; it simply makes them private.

This reduction forces individuals into a split existence. Marx likens this to a “lion’s skin,” concealing the egoistic individual masquerading as an equal, universal being (Marx, 34). The Egoist of civil society is the "real" man who views others as means to an end and property as a barrier. On the other hand, you are the abstract citizen, a "celestial" ghost who exists only in the abstract realm of the law. The "Hypocritical State" is the result of this split. It creates celestial legal equality, granting political emancipation, masking the "terrestrial" power of money and egoism that actually dictates livelihood. This is why the "Freedom of Conscience" is a trap. It grants the right to practice any chosen religion, ensuring that man’s deep truths remain private whims, where they cannot disrupt the terrestrial power of the market. 

Marx argues that true human emancipation begins when man refuses this reduction. It is the moment the "individual man absorbs the abstract citizen" back into his daily life, when labor and relationships are recognized as social powers rather than foreign power handed to the state (Marx, 46). 

Yet, without the shield of the abstract citizen, individuals do not have rights against society. If the “right to be separate” is destroyed, what protects the individual from the weight of the collective, especially if society is run by terrestrial power and the real man is still founded on egoism? 

Without the celestial pressure of the abstract state to constrain the real man, human emancipation risks becoming a triumph of the egoist.


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