The Difference Principle & Rationalizations for Modern-Day Capitalism


In Chapter 11, Rawls presents to the reader his two Principles of Justice. The First Principle, fairly rudimentary in its diagnosis of equality, states that “each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties, compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” (53). He identifies a specific stratum of freedoms that must be distributed equally and cannot be traded away, for economic gain or otherwise. These include political liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person, the right to hold personal property, and protection from arbitrary arrest under the rule of law. (53). These freedoms are all necessary, evidently just, and frankly, trite. 


In his Second Principle, however, Rawls introduces a level of complexity in his noble quest for justice. He declares that social and economic inequalities are in fact permissible, given that they are attached to equally accessible positions, and perhaps more importantly, are "reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage” (53, again). In explaining the latter stipulation, Rawls announces his Difference Principle. The Difference Principle requires that inequalities be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. The most just system, thus, becomes the one in which the poor are least disadvantaged, regardless of their relative position to the rich.


Rawls qualifies this further by differentiating between two cases of such occurrence: “The first case is that in which the expectations of the least advantaged are indeed maximized… The best arrangement obtains, what I shall call a perfectly just scheme. The second case is that in which the expectations of all those better off at least contribute to the welfare of the more unfortunate… Such a scheme is, I shall say, just throughout, but not the best just arrangement.” (68). In this delineation, Rawls ensures that a society can still be labeled “just throughout”, even if its benefit to the poor is not fully maximized.

Humor me for a minute, everyone, and suppose three possible societies:


In Society A, there is equality for all.

Everyone earns $20,000.


In Society B, there is inequality that maximises benefits to the unfortunate.

The Rich earn $60,000.

The Poor earn $40,000.


In Society C, inequality contributes to the unfortunate, but does not maximize it.

The Rich earn $70,000.

The Poor earn $30,000.


If we follow in accordance with the Difference Principle, we would reach the reasonable conclusion that Society B is more just than A and C because the worst-off have maximized expectation, but also that Society C is more just than Society A, simply because the poor remain advantaged over an equal but lesser-equipped society, and because the “expectations of all those better off at least contribute to the welfare of the more unfortunate”.



This, to me, is distinctly reminiscent of modern-day rationalizations for capitalism. Take, for example, this article published in The Forum by a good friend of mine. It purports capitalism as the Pareto-optimal choice which has “lifted a supermajority of the world’s population out of extreme poverty”, directly emulating Rawls’ conclusion of the most just system being one in which the “expectations of the least advantaged are indeed maximized”. (68) In fact, the concessions made by such proponents of capitalism also mirror a Rawlsian conclusion on my aforementioned scenario. The article acknowledges “rising income inequality” and concentrated wealth, but states that this scenario remains preferable to one that delivers “little more than equalizing poverty”. To Rawls, Scenario B is imperfect but permissible (and preferred to Scenario A), and proponents of capitalism follow similarly linear reasoning to advance their claims. To both parties, such a society is "just throughout", even in the presence of a greater option, one that services the (insert euphemistic word for the poor) to a greater degree, and should most definitely be preferred to an equal but lesser-endowed society.

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyFebruary 12, 2026 at 9:58 AM

    An interesting challenge. I think that part of Rawls' response to such a criticism turns on his requirement that the distribution of wealth and income maximizes the status of the least advantaged representative group. It is one thing to claim that the worst off are better off than they otherwise would have been, it is another thing to claim that society should constantly strive to bring it about that the worst off are the best off that they can possibly be. Only one group's utility really matters, in effect, for the DP, the least advantaged group.

    I also think that it is important to give its due to the first part of the second principle, fair equality of opportunity -- people with equal talents should have equal educational and other opportunities to develop those talents. Rawls thinks that THIS is the real game changer, and FE of O is lexically prior to distribution of wealth and income. Think about the changes the US would need to make to its educational system to secure fair equality of opportunity.

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