Tension Between Justice & The Fundamental Social Problems


Rawls writes “an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice [...] justice [is] uncompromising” (Rawls 4). According to Rawls, rights secured by justice are not to be violated, even for the greater social good. While there are differing conceptions of justice, trying to reach an agreement as to what justice entails is imperative. Without a general consensus, justice’s uncompromising nature is violated, i.e. to minority thinkers the dominant view of justice is engaging in the immoral calculus of social interests Rawls warns his readers of.

While consensus is important, Rawls highlights that a “viable human community” also considers other "fundamental social problems” aside from “agreement in conceptions of justice’ (Rawls 5). These social problems, “coordination, efficiency, and stability,” act as a foundation for justice. Individual plans need to be coordinated, they must be executed efficiently, and the manner in which they are executed must be structurally sound.

Rawls’s other fundamental social problems are necessary virtue; however, they become vices if they take precedence over justice. When the US prioritizes the efficiency of the plea bargain system over the justice of the 6th Amendment, it becomes a machine of management instead of an institution of justice. If low-income Americans have to waive their Constitutional rights and the wealthy can endlessly appeal, the immoral social calculus rears its ugly head.

While there are plenty of legal mechanisms like stare decisis, statues of limitations, and qualified immunity that aim to solve the fundamental social problems, if taken to the extreme, they end up undermining justice. How can we commit the lesser injustice and satisfy Rawls without losing sight of the bigger picture and becoming our own undoing?

Comments

  1. Asher CarrieroFebruary 11, 2026 at 11:41 PM

    Dylan this is very interesting and "Without a general consensus, justice’s uncompromising nature is violated" and the majority's justice becomes a utilitarian calculus Rawls rejects. But I think Rawls would distinguish between two types of disagreement. When Rawls talks about needing consensus, I see him talking about the principles chosen in the original position, not everyday political disagreement "Once we decide to look for a conception of justice that prevents the use of the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance as counters in a quest for political and economic advantage, we are led to these principles" (14). While I see valid analogy in your examples, I dont think Rawls is asking if everyone agrees on every outcome, but would everyone behind the veil of ignorance agree to these principles? The minority isn't being subjected to majority calculus if they would have consented to the same principles. I do however agree with you that this view may be problematic and raise that what happens to people who reject the original position framework entirely, Rawls claims to be writing for a constitutional democracy but I feel like the focus on rights is assumed and disregards possible nonwestern views that are not built upon our conception of rights.

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  2. Michelle LeeFebruary 12, 2026 at 12:14 AM

    I think what you are pointing out is interesting, Dylan. It makes me wonder if Rawls two points contradict one another. How could it be that both (1) justice is uncompromising and we must reach a consensus, and (2) justice depends on practical social conditions like coordination, efficiency, and stability? Maybe what Rawls really means is that justice is uncompromising in the original position, but when deciding democratic policies, we depend on social conditions.

    However, a problem I have with Rawls is that although I agree that justice should be uncompromising, I do not think we will ever reach a consensus on justice, even in the original position. I am not convinced that even if people were rational, free, and equal, and placed behind the veil of ignorance, they would converge on the same principles. People disagree not only about democratic policies but about whether a universal theory of justice even exists.

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  3. Paul HurleyFebruary 12, 2026 at 9:47 AM

    So much of what's at issue in these intriguing posts turns on questions surrounding the role of consensus. I'm not always sure what your arguments are presupposing the alternative should be -- coercing those who do not agree with us? not acting without consensus (when then would we ever act?)? manipulating people into consensus in violation of Rawls' publicity requirement?

    I guess I think that Rawls' target is more modest. If most of us share a concept of justice, and he thinks we do, and he can show us that this concept, clarified in ways that the concept commits us to, yields a determinate conception, then we will have compelling reasons to agree about fundamental principles. We will also agree to constitutional principles for implementing these principles, and to procedures for resolving the many disagreements that remain. Asher highlights these additional procedures, and Dylan highlights these residual disagreements. Rawls, I suspect, would agree with the challenges, but take himself to have provided the best approach to addressing them.

    On Michelle's challenge, would such people disagree about the principles chosen in the original position, or would they reject the original position as a legitimate thought experiment, because they would reject the concept of justice that it attempts to model? If the latter, are they more like flat earth theorists at an astronomy convention? How worried should astronomers be about them? So much to discuss!

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