Rawls versus Marx and Reflective Equilibrium

The Rawlsian social contract is an argument to guide the creation and application of intuitive principles of justice. Reflective equilibrium is Rawls’ way of allowing us to revise our principles of justice, to understand how our social cooperation can interact with the “original position”, or the thought experiment where our own conceptions of justice can be deemed fair, without influence from social factors like wealth or occupation. A person can engage in reflective equilibrium and “expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgements duly pruned and adjusted” (Rawls 18). Reflective equilibrium is a moral theory about how to form a set of principles of justice which are then applied to “the basic structure of society”. 




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Reflective equilibrium is especially necessary when evaluating Rawls’ explanation of why efficiency is not enough justification for unjust social institutions. Rawls is decidedly worried about justifying systems that are based on “morally arbitrary” factors, like utilitarianism or libertarianism (Rawls 63). He cites that these theories often cite the idea of efficiency as the only necessary conception of justice (which I believe could be tied to his ideas about procedural justice, I am not sure how yet).  Rawls cites different economic theories, like indifference curves and Pareto optimality to show that “the principle of efficiency cannot serve alone as a conception of justice” (Rawls 62). 


Rawls says we are to question our own conceptions of justice through reflective equilibrium- where in doing so, our choices made for “efficiency” could be understood as unjust if they restrict or worsen the bottom line in a society. However, if Rawls bases his theory of justice on the subject of the institutions of a society, or decidedly not bottom-up from the individual's interaction. How can reflective justice be used if we are all operating under either just or unjust institutions of society? How can we be at fault for unjust behavior if the institutions themselves are supposed to be upholding these equality principles derived from the original position? You could even imagine a Marxist perspective to Rawls. He would argue that reflective equilibrium is only useful if you can be free from ideology. Marx is concerned that the structure is the problem, he would claim the social institutions perpetuate ideological norms. But Rawls argues that the structure is the basis of justice in society. 

Comments

  1. Nethra MahendranFebruary 12, 2026 at 9:25 AM

    You ask a question about how reflective equilibrium can even be used, if we are already “operating under either just or unjust institutions”. While this question is very critical, Rawls offers a specific answer in his own writing. Rawls explains that reflective equilibrium and this sense of justice is essentially a mental capacity and/or a skill. Here, because the original position is a hypothetical procedure, people can enter by following specific rationale constraints of the veil of ignorance. Therefore, individuals can envision social objectives from after and filter out the top down influences of their social status. Then, as Rawls maintains, the reflective equilibrium requires “pruning” one’s judgement. Similarly, regarding your question of fault, Rawls offers the distinction between principles of institutions and principles for individuals by explaining the partial compliance theory, which governs how to responsibly deal with existing injustice. Reflective equilibrium itself is the process of mutual support which will allow individuals to revise principles until they reach a justified view of justice.

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  2. Paul HurleyFebruary 12, 2026 at 10:23 AM

    Great topic, Georgia; interesting response, Nethra! Marx is certainly going to worry that if we suffer from ideological false consciousness, our considered judgments and intuitions are going to skew any effort to deploy reflective equilibrium. But isn't Rawls' point no different that scientist's point about the role of theory (principles) and observation (considered judgments) in science? We check our theory against our observations, and we check our observations against theory (e.g. theory suggests a different interpretation of the observation that the sun goes around the Earth. Isn't reflective equilibrium just the same methodological approach deployed in thinking about justice? The creationist claims to have an archimedean point outside of science though which to criticize science -- religion; perhaps Rawls' suggestion is that we should view Marx similarly, as claiming to have an archimedean point outside of thinking about justice from which to criticize theories of justice?

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