Marx & Love

In Freedom, Democracy, and Economic Rights: A Kantian View, Suzie Love discusses the idea that our economic system must be governed democratically, as per Kantian freedom. She establishes first by taking us through the ideas that one should not exercise their rights unilaterally for it might cause another to become their subordinate, and then leads into a discussion of the one innate right, which “serves as the foundation for a full and coherent system of rights, where rights are not in conflict with one another" (4). Interestingly enough, only external objects can be determined through democratic processes–those determined by innate right cannot be regulated. And this, says Love, is what determines the jurisdiction of democracy. 

Further into her paper, Love establishes a theory of intermediated capitalism, or the incorporation of democratic governance into corporate governance [wherein] . . . representatives of worker, consumer, and environmental groups take direct part in governing corporations from within” (8). So the economy is a system of governance or regulation, rather than a market. As we know, Kant does not care about efficiency – it is all about democratic choice. But smartly, Love emphasizes that while efficiency is not the crux (or even a remote worry)  of the Kantian argument, it is still important that we address it – the conventional view itself might not be able to attain full economic democracy. 

While Love’s depiction of such arguments is interesting, what fascinates me the most is how a marxist might respond to Love’s argument. We are those who create indeterminate rights through an omnilateral will, representing all those who exist within it. In a capitalist society wherein democratic processes are constantly skewed by economic powers, how can our mere right to democratic economic governance be exercised within this system without breaking the cycle of capitalism? Even more so, what does the actual right to economic democracy mean for the people who currently lack power, politically and economically? 

And personally, I wonder: what exactly is the scope of the democratic economic governance? 

 

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