Kantian Freedom and the Limits of Full Economic Democracy

In Freedom, Democracy, and Economic Rights: A Kantian View, Love talks about the conventional view, which states that “property rights have no determinate content prior to positive lawgiving establishing them” (7). Crucial to this view is that rights regarding property depend on the structure of individuals' relationships with one another. Therefore, individuals have no rightful relationship with objects, and property rights must be established through omnilateral lawgiving. Since property rights must be created omnilaterally, property rights must be determined democratically. This means that in this view, the economy is a governance system, rather than a market. It is crucial to point out that in this view, efficiency cannot override democratic choice. That is why if there is a more democratic alternative to capitalism, Kantian theory will require it. Love states that arguments that claim that a true democratic alternative is infeasible fail when they rely on arguments about efficiency and productivity. This is because what truly matters in Kantian theory is our rights to economic democracy. However, in the end, Love ultimately suggests that the conventional view may go too far if taken to require full economic democracy. This is because a fully economic democracy may be too slow to keep up with markets and technologies.

However, I wonder if this goes against her prior arguments. If the right to economic democracy is grounded in Kantian rights, how do concerns about speed justify limiting democratic control over economic institutions? Maybe I am interpreting her wrong, and what she is really saying is that there can never be a fully economic democracy. This however, is similar to the infeasible arguments she refutes earlier, where people claim that a truly democratic alternative is infeasible. Alternatively, she may be claiming that fully democratic control over all economic decisions may not be coherent. However, does this mean that we should limit our right to economic democracy? 

I think a better way she could have refuted a full-blown economic democracy is by claiming that the idea of a maximal economic democracy goes against Kant’s idea of freedom. If all economic decisions are made democratically, does that not go against our innate right to be independent from the constraints of others' choices? From a Kantian perspective, the problem with a fully economic democracy is the risk of collective domination, where individual independence is undermined by the ongoing choices of the collective.


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