Judgement-Bypassing: When does Coordination Become Undemocratic?


When Hussain describes institutions within the advanced market economy as “judgment-bypassing,” it initially

sounds anti-democratic. In the Kantian framework Love develops, there is inherent tension between

judgement-bypassing institutions and democracy because they fail to respect the right of citizens to establish

rights through democratic processes and the true omnilateral will, regardless of outcome. If Kantian freedom

requires that we guide our actions through our own practical judgment, then an economic system that bypasses

judgment seems incompatible with freedom altogether. Yet Hussain argues that a “judgment-bypassing”

institution can still be compatible with Kantian freedom if it “operate[s] as an extension of their rational

capacities” by being reason-sensitive, transparent, and trustworthy (Love, 8). 


But is all coordination judgment-bypassing? 


Love reminds us that coordination is unavoidable. Because individuals must coordinate their activities to

avoid “colliding with others,” they must establish a system of rights (Love, 5). To respect freedom, this

coordination must be done through omnilateral will. Further, collective democratic lawgiving must be

compatible with the innate right to freedom and rightful relationships. 


In complex societies, however, much of our coordination occurs without constant or explicit collective

deliberation. Language, cultural norms, and algorithmic systems shape society without being dependent on

the democratic processes. If some non-deliberative coordination is inevitable, then bypassing judgment

cannot by itself be the democratic violation. The deeper issue seems to be whether bypassing judgment

means acting without consent, or simply acting without conscious participation. Love suggests that

bypassing judgment becomes a violation of democratic consent when it structures our rightful relationships

without being made together through the omnilateral will. 


I’m curious how Love would draw that line. In complex societies, where does legitimate coordination

become impermissible judgment-bypassing?

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