Democracy's demise

Love’s Kantian Right to Democracy seems extraordinarily compelling if one forgets about the very effects of a country governed by democratic and capitalistic values. Love grounds her arguments of the state’s involvement in Kant’s moral theory of right which represents a fundamental respect for each person’s humanity (3). This humanity is taken to be a person’s rational agent of choice, their ability to make autonomous decisions, independent of the constraints of others. Further, Love emphasizes that by Kant’s grounds, once again, laws should be omnilateral because they are essentially relational (5). Therefore, our relational rights must be governed by an omnilateral body, that being the state. The reason for democratic values or a democratic structure, Love argues, is grounded in Kant’s arguments for independence that honor the innate right (6). 

I think it is at this point in which I find myself questioning how deeply Kant’s moral arguments are being supported. Love seems to claim that state intervention and ideas of a robust state are necessary to ensuring and securing the rights of all individuals. However, I find myself wondering why these political proposals of government are so determined to attach capabilities to governments to intervene and reorganize property or wealth or any type of resources when instead a proper proposal that values equality would not present a system that has potential to be exploited in any way. Would we genuinely rather institute methods of redistributing resources than ensure that resources never are unequal and never have reason to be redistributed? These democratic values of preserving one’s independence have undeniable effects that Marx writes about. Concern for oneself becomes the head of society, community takes a back seat and general care for one another becomes so scarce that those who donate to necessary causes are considered charitable and kind. 


To me, it seems it does not matter whether democratic structures initially preserve or secure our rights. It does not matter that we can see alignment with the ideals of this system and Kant’s moral theory. Rather, every ideal that democracy is based upon and every premise of Kant’s moral theory goes out the window when we forget to account for the effect of human alienation and capitalistic motivation. I’m yet to understand how idealistic democratic values can actually counter such an effect. Can moral arguments still be substantive when we remain blindly optimistic? 

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