Behind the Veil of Ignorance

Rawls introduces the veil of ignorance as part of the “original position”, which is a hypothetical choice situation meant to model fairness. The idea is that principles of justice are those that free and equal persons would choose under conditions that prevent bias. In the original position, “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities…” (11). And further,  “the parties do not know their conceptions of the good” (11). The veil removes knowledge of religion, race, wealth, intelligence, social class, and even one’s particular conception of the good. 

So, behind the veil, Chris doesn’t know he’s a conservative, Jane does not know she is an atheist, and Luis doesn’t know he’s a high-earning entrepreneur. Each knows they will have some conception of the good, but not which one. Because they might turn out to hold any worldview or occupy any position, they’re motivated to choose principles that protect everyone’s ability to pursue their own conception of the good. So, the veil functions as a device of impartiality. Thus, it prevents principles from being tailored to one’s advantages.

Rawls describes this initial situation as fair “between individuals as moral persons, that is, as rational beings … capable … of a sense of justice” (11). The parties are defined as rational and capable of a sense of justice. Yet in society, people differ significantly in cognitive ability, dependence, and developmental stage (e.g, young children, cognitively disabled, etc.) If justice is modeled as an agreement among rational beings capable of a sense of justice, what is the status of those who cannot meaningfully participate in such an agreement? Does grounding equality in rational moral capacity risk excluding forms of human vulnerability?


Comments

  1. Ellie HalabyFebruary 12, 2026 at 8:44 AM

    Tonalli, I think that this could be an excellent critique of Rawls' conception of an original position. Similar to how Locke neglected to fully consider the family in his conceptions of the social contract, I think that thought experiments like these lose their efficacy when faced with how much they deviate from real life situations- situations where significant cognitive differences have a very real impact on how people can live their lives and participate in whatever system, democratic or otherwise, they exist in.
    To treat Rawls charitably, I think this veil of ignorance would also treat each of these individuals as rational. Because it is just a thought experiment, I'm not sure how much conversations about real life circumstances affect the function of Rawls' argument. Just as no one can actually remove their knowledge of religion, race, wealth, class, etc. to reach a conception of the good, no one can actually remove cognitive disability in order to reach a conception of the good. I believe Rawls would respond to your argument by simply placing cognitive ability among the list of things he believes individuals would be ignorant of behind the veil, while claiming that rationality and cognitive ability are two different things.
    Thus, your qualm seems to be less about the specifics of what is included in the thought experiment, and more about how fruitful thought experiments as a whole really are at the end of the day. I find myself asking these questions while reading Rawls as well, and am looking forward to bringing it up in class.

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  2. Dylan GonzalezFebruary 12, 2026 at 9:22 AM

    I like the question you raise about the place of children and cognitively disabled folks in Original Position. Trying to answer your question, I came up with a few answers.

    1) Children and the cognitively disabled are not in original position to begin with since they're generally not rational. Original position is the dawn of society, so the only people there are the rational primordial Adams and Eves (which you'd need minimum 1k of to sustain a long-term population). People will make the society and then have children; spontaneous genetic mutations give way to people with cognitive disabilities.

    2) Picture those in the original position not as Adams and Eves but as souls/cosmic species-beings. They're people, but without any tangible form since they don't know their religion, race, class, etc. This would mean that the souls debating in the Original Position can still be rational and accommodate for children and people with disabilities because they very well could fall into one of those groups once society begins. Therefore, the groups you mention still have a place in the Original Position deliberations.

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  3. Paul HurleyFebruary 12, 2026 at 10:13 AM

    Picking up on a suggestion by Ellie, include among the things that you do not know behind the veil your level of cognitive ability; indeed, doesn't he do this already? You don't know how cognitively able you will be; aren't you just pointing to the lower end of that continuum? Also include where in your life you are, and even whether or not you have yet been born. Why not have the next generation included under the veil? Rawls is going to ask why this isn't a great strategy for safeguarding the equal claims of children and the cognitively impaired. Why isn't your alleged weakness in his account a relative strength of his account? Locke and Smith struggle with kids; why doesn't the veil of ignorance avoid these struggles?

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