Working Smarter, not Harder

In Anderson’s novel, much of the debate surrounding what compels a strong work ethic is predicated on the nature of the inputs and outputs that are present in a labor-demanding society. Conservatives, who harbor “an extremely harsh set of attitudes towards the working poor”, credit a lack of work-ethic to detriments like vice and a lack of discipline (Anderson 130). Drawing from their disdain and skepticism of plight towards the working class, conservatives propose solutions of enforced poverty to induce in the working class a self-motivation to both produce more effectively and to “ submit to the dictatorial authority of their social superiors” (Anderson 136). Much to the contrary, progressives condemn such a perspective and place more emphasis on the autonomy and liberty accorded to the working class. (Anderson 133, 142) Anderson offers up Smith as a member of this camp, citing his promotions of a working class that, given liberation and discretion, “shall enjoy the fruits of it’s own labor” (Anderson 136).  

Amidst all of this cumbersome discussion, on page 137, Anderson briefly addresses what I believe to be a rather pivotal and overlooked input in the discussion of productivity & work ethic -- leisure. Anderson provides us with Smith’s account of how a proclivity towards leisure, derided as an exemplar of low work ethic, has the capacity to create the best outcomes for a productive society. 


Smith gives an anecdote of how out of a want for leisure, a workboy created a contrivance that did his work for him, allowing him to spend time playing with his friends, maximizing his productivity in both a personal and a public capacity. In this case, a proclivity for leisure was the input in motivating him to advance production rather than a detriment to his industriousness. Previously, on page 129, Anderson states that leisure is regarded as a “reward of industry”, but I am of the opinion that it can operate a motivator as well. Many of industrial society's greatest contrivances were from a desire to reduce the amount of labor demanded from humans and instead spend time on other duties, chiefly leisure. Innovations in agriculture, industry, and mining (all relevant to Smith’s time) are frequently motivated by attempts to conserve manual labor rather than to exemplify industriousness for its own sake. I really hate to invoke this cliché, but perhaps both Anderson and Smith shouldve markedly emphasized working smarter, not harder. 


When the question of leisure as a means for innovation is tested against Locke, it brings about a convoluted and perhaps contradictory response. Locke claims that it is a God-given decree to “be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth”, including “the improvement too of … the conveniences of life” (Anderson 26). At the same time, he maintains that “God grants salvation to ‘him that worketh’ as his ‘title’ or ‘claim of right’”. (Anderson 26). In the case of the workboy, which of God’s ordinances supercedes the other? The workboy certainly brought about an improvement in the “conveniences of life” by crafting a labor-avoiding invention, but in doing so, he also circumvented his duty to work and toil relentlessly for the betterment of mankind. In chasing leisure and concurrently innovating, has the boy obeyed God’s order but forgone his title to salvation?

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyJanuary 29, 2026 at 9:20 AM

    So helpful to focus on leisure, and I do think that your final question for Locke is a very good one. The workboy anecdote from Smith is also great for your purposes, but it does raise the question of whether working smarter, understood as increasing productivity, results in many cases in certain people working just as hard, while others lose their jobs entirely. Is the work time saved distributed over the original workers in the form of additional leisure for each, or is the tendency to have the same amount of work as before, now distributed over fewer workers (leaving the others without work)?

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