Slavery: Hobbes v Locke

Locke and Hobbes’ differing views on slavery and resistance are rooted in the idea of whether anyone is owed anything by nature. 

Hobbes argues that no one deserves anything by nature, but rather from contracts, laws, and promises. Nature grants merely a right of self-preservation, not a right to freedom or equality. Justice is intertwined with order, based entirely on keeping covenants. Because the sovereign is not held to a covenant with the people, resistance is rarely justified. Slavery, understood as a consequence of war, was therefore not inherently unjust within Hobbes’s framework. Although enslaved persons retained the right to resist or even kill their masters, this right does not constitute a political or moral claim against authority but rather the right to self-preservation. Slavery is compatible with justice for Hobbes, as justice is created by political order, independent from equality, human rights, or moral desert. 


Locke takes a contrasting approach, grounding property in nature rather than government. Beginning with self-ownership and extending to common goods mixed with one’s labor, Locke argues that individuals possess natural rights prior to entering political society. These rights set moral limits on political power rather than emerging from it. Slavery, therefore, is an arbitrary power over another’s life, a condition that no consent can legitimate because although individuals own their labor, they lack the authority to give another person absolute power over their life. Because slavery violates rights the government is created to protect, it represents not lawful authority but a reversion to a state of war. Resistance is therefore not a rejection of political order for Locke, but a defense of the moral boundaries that make political authority legitimate.


Comments

  1. Paul HurleyJanuary 22, 2026 at 8:50 AM

    It is interesting to think through how the laws of nature in Locke apply to the question of slavery. Is an attempt by person X to enslave Person Y just straightforwardly a violation of Y's equal liberty and equal rights. If so, are all others obligated in the state of nature to intervene to uphold Person Y's right and to punish Person X?

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