Property, Inheritance, and Consequentialism

While Locke’s state of nature exists before government, people possess the basic components of political authority. Individuals have legislative power through the law of nature, reason, which is universally recognized and morally binds. Moreover, executive authority exists to enforce and punish violations of natural law to seek restitution, but in doing so, individuals must determine whether a violation occurred and levy appropriate punishment, which leads to inconsistency in the application of judicial power. The absence of a neutral institution drives people to leave the state of nature not because it is chaotic as Hobbes suggests, but because impartial judgement and reliable enforcement are two unreasonable endeavors. 

This is particularly illustrative in the discussion of property. Since individuals can acquire ownership by mixing their labor with the commons, property exists prior to the state and in accordance with reason. Therefore, an interesting consequence arises—Locke’s state of nature allows for inheritance, because if property can be genuinely possessed, it can also be transferred to offspring. This does not exist under Hobbes, however, because a parent cannot pass anything down since nothing is theirs to give until the sovereign exists and legally permits it. 

Taken together, this reveals a deeper moral divide. Locke’s theory is constrained by how actions are performed, not by what they produce. His “spoilage” and “enough and as good” provisos, which reason that people should only use as much as they require and the remaining limited resources should be left for others, is a fundamentally means-based concept. If a person picked three extra bananas from the tree and could not eat them before they spoiled, even though the outcome is largely insignificant to public good, Locke believes this to be unjust. Hobbes, while not a consequentialist, treats equality and fear as reasons to prioritize peace, but not as moral limits on the procedures, like absolute monarchy, used to secure it. 







 

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyJanuary 21, 2026 at 11:41 PM

    The contrast with inheritance is interesting. Is the Locke as straightforward as you suggest? What if, if my child inherits my land and adds it to her own, she will have more than she can use without spoiling? Would she not be able to inherit? Also, it is certainly true, for Hobbes, that if you can't have property in the state of nature, no one can inherit the property you have. I am less clear on the consequentialism contrast -- something to elaborate upon in seminar?

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