Liberty, Property, and the State of War

Hobbes defines the term ‘liberty’ as the absence of external impediments that have the ability to redact from man’s power. Within his conception of the natural condition, every man has the right to ‘every thing’ – and the liberty to use his power for self-preservation (by the right of nature), which leads to the state of war. He purports that life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". 

This unrestricted liberty creates the fear of imminent death and violence where there exists no “mine and thine”, and therefore, an inability to secure or even define property. Hobbes proposes the transfer of natural liberty to a sovereign or Commonwealth, who then has the ability to define and protect property as a means of self-preservation and the prevention of the state of war. 

Locke believes that natural liberty exists only in conjunction with the law of nature as a rule. In contrast to Hobbes, he argues that property itself is a natural right that exists prior to the state: he has property in his own body and its labor. By ‘mixing’ his labor with God-given resources, man distributes his private title (ownership) to such goods, excluding others. Therefore, man must unite under a Commonwealth to preserve his own property and exercise his liberty. Unlike Hobbes, Locke maintains that natural liberty is only intelligible within bounds set by the right to property. The preexisting rights to property restrict and define the scope of political and personal liberties of man within society. 

While cynical, Hobbes’ view of a man’s right to nature (his liberty to use his power for self-preservation) leading to a perpetually destructive state of war is critical. Even if Locke’s law of nature maintains an objective standard of reasoning which governs man’s behavior even before the existence of a state, without an absolute or even common power to subdue them, his individual interpretation of reason and liberty will inevitably become a source of conflict. At least, by Hobbes, there exists an indisputable Commonwealth. But at what cost? On the other hand, by Locke’s argument, how can there exist a common arbitrator if the ultimate right to judge a breach of property, liberty, and even trust is left to the mere man? Does there even exist any way to avoid collapsing into Hobbes’ state of war?

 

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyJanuary 21, 2026 at 11:48 PM

    An interesting place to push on the contrast. I think that Locke will agree with your last point, that there can't be a common arbitrator if the ultimate right to judge is held by individual men. But that's why individual men contract to give that right up to the commonwealth. In short, it your question for Locke a challenge to his argument, or the challenge that his argument attempts to solve?

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