Hobbes and Locke on Nature

Hobbes believes the state of nature is a perpetual state of war and insecurity, motivated by every man’s desire for self-preservation and equal ability to kill another. To escape this state of nature, Hobbes states that the people should establish an absolute sovereign.

Locke, on the other hand, defines the state of nature as a state of “equality” and “perfect freedom.” The “state of equality” Locke is referring to is a state where all men are equal amongst each other in their power and jurisdiction. No man has the ability to subordinate or subject another and all men have a duty to maximize justice. The “state of freedom” refers to the fact that all men can order their actions as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature. This means that all men have the executive power of the law of nature. However, he admits that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases because of their own self-love and ill-nature. Therefore, Locke suggested a civil government as the proper remedy. He emphasizes the fact that absolute monarchs are but men who may also be influenced by the same self-love and ill-nature as any other man.

Locke’s account of property also differs greatly from Hobbes's. While Hobbes believes there can be no property, Locke states that men can acquire property by mixing nature with their labour. It should be noted that he believes that property ownership does not need government. He says clearly that “labor, in the beginning, gave a right of property” (27). However, as the number of people increased and the use of money made property such as land more scarce, compacts and agreements settled property disputes.

A difficulty I have with Locke’s account is the fact that while he claims the state of nature is pre-political, with men having the executive power of the law of nature, he, in the end, introduces civil government to make agreements and judgments.

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyJanuary 21, 2026 at 11:35 PM

    A lot of claims here about Locke and Hobbes, most of them true. It is a little less clear how they amount to critical engagement with some particular element of either or both of their accounts. I'm not clear why the 'difficulty' you introduce at the end is a difficulty. Can't Locke say both the men have executive power in a pre-political state of nature, and the they have good reasons to give this power to a political society? A little more on why this amounts to a difficulty on your view would really help.

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