Ellie's Post

 

Particularly fascinating to me in Anderson’s assessment of Smith is her contention that Smith can be read as a virtue ethicist, particularly with regard to work ethic. Anderson states: “the work ethic— the ‘habits of economy, industry, discretion, attention, and application of thought’— lies at the core of Smith’s account of virtue. A habit counts as a virtue if it would be approved by an impartial spectator” (Anderson, 136). 


In “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” Smith also focuses on Justice as a virtue— but while Justice is a negative virtue, work ethic is a positive one. That is to say, in the words of Smith, “mere justice is… but a negative virtue… and only hinders us from hurting our neighbor” (Smith, 81). In contrast, work ethic constitutes positive actions which benefit not only ourselves, but our neighbors. 


I wonder if, despite accounts coming from different texts, the relationship between Justice and Work Ethic, according to Smith, lies in the difference between their categories of ethicality. Is justice merely a virtue due to its capacity to promote work ethic? After all, Justice merely hinders us from hurting our neighbor— is it a negative virtue because it prevents us from letting our neighbors work hard, or reap the benefits of their hard work? 


Perhaps it is this connection from which Smith’s condemnation of unpaid labor stems— while he accepts the legitimacy of wage labor, he also “declaims at length against two forms of unfree labor: slavery and apprenticeship” (Anderson, 142). While he does not explicitly mention justice in his account, the connection can be made that justice is a prerequisite to the positive merit of work ethic, in order for the work ethic to turn over fruitful labor.      

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyJanuary 28, 2026 at 11:16 PM

    Really helpful focus on justice in Smith. Smith even characterizes justice as a 'cold' virtue. It tells you not to commit harms or wrongs against other people, but does not require you to help them -- that's what beneficence does. Notice, though, that Smith thinks that it is justice that is the key to the efficient functioning of markets, the virtue without which markets would 'crumble into atoms'. One way to think about it is the on the economic model markets only function efficiently in the absence of pervasive coercion and deception. If lots of transactions are involuntary (things taken by force), or deceptive (so we don't know the real value of what we are transacting for), markets break down. It is the virtue of justice that constrains us for coercion and deception, hence that is a precondition for the efficient functioning of markets. But you are certainly right that Smith thinks positive virtues are necessary for society not just to function, but to flourish.

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