Anderson's Mistake about Locke

Elizabeth Anderson argues that the libertarian reading of Locke is deeply mistaken about Locke’s moral foundation. While libertarians claim that Locke derives everyone’s equal natural rights from negative liberties, Anderson claims that Locke derives such rights from a fundamental universal duty to protect and support other human beings(23). However, she is wrong about this. Locke’s primary moral foundation is not that humans have a duty to protect others, but rather that they have the duty not to harm others’ life, liberty, and property. In other words, in the state of nature, it is not that we aim to support others' survival, but rather not to wrong others.

This mistake Anderson makes follows into later parts of the paper when she says that Waldron’s assumption that Locke must have an argument to rationalize the impoverished landless workers can’t be right. She claims this because, in her view, such a state violates Locke’s fundamental law of nature: that people secure the flourishing of each individual (33). However, as stated before, Locke’s fundamental law of nature is not to promote the survival of others.

This misidentification of Locke’s moral foundation continues in Anderson’s reasoning for why she believes that Locke thinks the state may legitimately regulate property and block infinite accumulation (34). Anderson claims that “the fact that Locke contrasts the natural law rules that lead to inequality in the state of nature, to the laws that regulate the right of property under governments, where the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions,” indicates that Locke thinks the state may legitimately regulate property (34). However, what Locke really says is that the state enforces natural property rights through positive laws.

Since Locke’s moral foundation is grounded in the duty not to wrong others and their property, it is difficult to use it as justification for why the state may block infinite accumulation. Therefore, while I agree that Anderson is correct in identifying the government as a way to solve the failure of the sufficiency proviso in the state of nature, she stretches Locke’s primary moral foundation to justify this point.

Comments

  1. Paul HurleyJanuary 29, 2026 at 9:11 AM

    A powerful challenge. It would help to drive it home if you could cite the text that you think Anderson is misinterpreting, or that supports your very different reading.

    ReplyDelete

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