Absolute Authority and War

A conception of the state of war is a critical component of both Hobbes and Locke's works. While both contend that a state of war necessitates "enmity and destruction," they differ in the relationship between states of war in nature. 

Both authors begin with a designation of equality to the state of nature, but they do so in different ways.  Hobbes states that man's equality derives from equality in capacity for destruction of each other, and goes on to contend that man's propensity to act self-interestedly causes such equality to manifest into a state of total war, where man's life is "nasty, brutish, and short." He then goes on to authorize the absolute power of the state to protect individuals from the brutality of such an existence. Locke, alternatively, establishes equality in the state of nature by relying on a lack of the power and jurisdiction in a state of nature which would introduce the capacity for inequality. That said, a state of total war could arise if and only if man vies for absolute power: "he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power,  does thereby put himself into a state of war with him."

Hobbes' and Locke's fundamental differences in belief structures are seen explicitly in the relationship between total war and absolute power. While Hobbes contends that absolute power protects man from the state of total war, Locke claims that seeking absolute power is what causes total war. In order to fully understand this discrepancy, questions arise as to how these philosophers differ in their view of man's innate tendencies. How does each author's conception of the psychology of man impact their view of the relationship between absolute authority and a state of total war? 



Comments

  1. Paul HurleyJanuary 21, 2026 at 11:54 PM

    Intriguing point in the last paragraph about contrasting views regarding absolute power. I'm less clear, however, why you claim that there is for Locke a lack of power and jurisdiction in the state of nature that "would introduce the capacity for inequality." Isn't his account of money an account of how inequality CAN legitimately arise in the state of nature?

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