A Criticism on the Sympathy of Status

The criticism Anderson makes on the “sufficiency proviso” articulated by Locke is rooted in the fundamental moral principles that require the state itself to rectify inequalities which arise from a private enclosure of natural resources. She classifies Locke as a proponent of the progressive work ethic which searches for a social order wherein honest industry is rewarded for both the rich and poor. This material sufficiency stands as a prerequisite for democratic equality wherein citizens can exist without the threat of oppression. 

Anderson briefly engages with Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, as an advocate of “progressive work ethic” revealing a psychological barrier (154). While she treats this modern epistemology of suspicion towards the poor as a neoliberal hijacking of history, Smith identifies the human tendency to worship wealth as a universal cause of the corruption of our own moral sentiments—an inherent principle of human nature that is crucial to maintaining the distinction of ranks in society. She maintains that, “Smith’s reputation as an advocate of severe laissez-faire principles is due not to only his mistaken reception, but to bad timing. . . free market principles that he thought would deliver greater autonomy, respectability, prosperity, and leisure to the working classes turned out to have much harsher consequences for them as the Industrial Revolution proceeded” (154). 

But a deeper question exists here: is it possible for sympathy to overcome status? Anderson would likely argue that relational equality is possible with the impartial spectator described by Smith, similar to the veil of ignorance for which John Rawls says a just society can be created behind. If our sympathy for those who are prosperous is naturally more lively than our feelings for workers, then the vision Anderson has of society in which citizens take mutual recognition for granted  requires more than just Lockean sufficiency. It would likely require a fundamental (and likely impossible) re-engineering of human moral sentiments in order to prevent humans from reverting back to status-based hierarchies that Anderson seeks to abolish. 


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